The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was perceived as a way to overcome the shortcomings of the previous EU policies towards the Mediterranean region. However, it has not represented a breakthrough from the old EU polices in the region. It has reflected continuity rather than novelty in terms of EU relations with its neighbors. It lacks the attractive incentives which are powerful enough to speed reforms and change in the targeted states.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist Eastern block, the EU foreign policy has aimed at avoiding new dividing lines between Western Europe and its neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe, and South of the Mediterranean. The enlargement of EU membership was an effective tool to attract the new emerging states in Eastern and Southern Europe over the last two decades to be integrated into the European economic and political spheres. The EU is currently composed of 27 member states with about 497 million populations. The biggest enlargement occurred in May 2004 when 10 other European states mostly from the former Eastern block became members in the European Union. In January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. In the future, the EU would be enlarged to include Croatia, Turkey and Western Balkans. The subsequent enlargement waves since the end of cold war has imposed new geographical and political reality for the EU which contributed in the development of its policies towards its old and new neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe and in the Mediterranean region. As a response to the changing geo-political reality of the EU, there has been two different tactics that has been implemented by the EU to mange relations with its emerging neighbors. Firstly, the golden carrot of membership which was successfully functioned with the Central and Eastern European countries and it is currently negotiated with Turkey, Croatia and Western Balkan. Secondly, the EU has invested a variety of "stabilization/cooperation/partnership" multilateral and bilateral instruments with its partners to maintain stability and security in the neighboring states. Out of these instruments were the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and recently the Union for Mediterranean (UFM).
1- The determinants of the EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region.
EU perceives security as a major motivation to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean relations. The security threats which characterize the Mediterranean region are immense. The European Security Strategy (ESS) has identified five security challenges for the European states, namely terrorism, nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts, failing states, organized crime including drugs, arms and illegal immigration. Such threats are different from the traditional ones that required military advancement only; the new post-Cold War threats require economic and political engagement and not just military tools. In December 2003, the European Council issued a document on relations with the Arab states. The document defined the principles governing the relations between EU and the Arab states by highlighting the issues of political, social and economic reform and developing political dialogue with the Arab states to enhance democracy. Furthermore, Security has been underlined by the ENP official document which confirmed that the EU has been surrounded by "the root causes of political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies, conflicts, poverty and social exclusion". Finally, Peace and settlement between Arab states and Israel has been always considered by the EU as a strategic entry for stability and security in the whole Mediterranean region and the Arab world.
The cooperation in the filed of energy is another important determinant of the Euro-Mediterranean relations which was underlined in the Barcelona declaration with the objective of “creating the appropriate framework conditions for investments and the activities of energy companies, cooperating in creating the conditions enabling such companies to extend energy networks and promoting link-ups”. The EU member states import 13% of their oil and 20% of their gas consumption from the Mediterranean states which consider important transit points for energy coming from the gulf and Caspian region. According to Gandara, "Algeria, Libya and Egypt have the potential to become major suppliers of both gas and oil to Europe, based on their transport advantage." Moreover, the issues of environmental friendly energy resources and climatic change have also become on the table between EU and the Mediterranean governments. It is also worthy to mention that the Mediterranean countries are rich with new and renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, hydropower and sustainable biofuels. Finally, having an efficient infrastructure for liberal market, trade and investment in the Mediterranean region would generate mutual economic benefits for Europe and the Mediterranean states.
2- EU Law and the European cooperation with the Neighborhood
The EU law provides the union and member states with a variety of soft, civil and military tools to undertake international cooperation with third countries. The recent Lisbon treaty has inserted some legal and institutional modifications in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy to promote the EU as a global actor and to strengthen its response to the accelerating global challenges and crises. In this framework, Lisbon treaty has established the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to "contribute through his proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and to ensure the implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council. The treaty has also established provisions on the common security and defense policy. According to Article 42 (1),
It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.
Before the Lisbon treaty, the EU contributed to civilian operations in its neighbors, such as Western Balkans, Iraq, Palestine within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDF). The tasks diverged from police missions to border assistance.
The EU's law clearly encourages the Union to undertake special legal arrangements with neighboring countries. Article 8 of Lisbon treaty says that,
The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation . . . the Union may conclude specific agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.
The reference to the values of the Union in the Article 8 has been embodied in most of the Union development and cooperation agreements with third countries. These values as defined in article 2 of the Lisbon treaty are "the respect of human dignity, freedom, Democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities." Moreover, Article 3 (5) stipulates that " in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values . . . it shall contribute to peace, security . . . and the protection of human rights" Therefore, it is mandatory pursuant to the European Union law to mainstream human rights in the EU's foreign policy. This legal obligation explains the human rights essential element clause which exists in all bilateral association agreements between the EU and its Eastern and Mediterranean neighbors.
3- The Existing Instruments between EU and the Neighboring States.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has been the main policy framework gathered the European states with their Mediterranean partners. Along 5500km in the south, the EU has maritime border with ten Mediterranean countries (Morocco- Algeria- Tunisia- Israel- Egypt-Palestine-Syria- Algeria- Lebanon-Libya). EMP is an application for the partnership and cooperation approach which was applied by the EU to strengthen relations with its neighbors who don't have the perspective of membership. The objectives of EMP were illustrated in the Barcelona declaration which was adopted by the EU and 12 neighboring Mediterranean countries on 28 November 1995. According to the declaration, the EMP seeks to promote security and sustainable development in the region through the conclusion of association agreements. The partners pledged to establish Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. Since 1995, the EU has signed bilateral association agreements with all Mediterranean partners except Libya and Syria. Human rights and democracy is an essential element in the bilateral association agreements. All association agreements contain the famous Article 2 on human rights conditionality which stipulate that "relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the agreement itself, shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this agreement." Moreover, the association agreements have established joint forums where partners regularly engage in dialogue and review the progress achieved in the bilateral economic, political, social and cultural relations. Since the beginning of the 1990s the EU has been active in the Middle-East peace process. It has been also a major objective of the EMP to reach a sustainable peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Nevertheless, the EMP has not been able to realize its objectives. According to Acikmese "the EU engagement in the Middle East peace process has rather been modest . . . EMP is based on the principle of regionalism . . . without attaching any importance to the [peculiarities of partners]. . . This principle made the leading up to the 2010 Free Trade Area excruciatingly slow." In addition, many of the Mediterranean states were not able to have an open market in Europe for their agriculture exports where they have relative advantage. Finally, the EU failed in addressing the deteriorated human rights and democracy records in the partner states. Consequently, The European Union realized that its policies with its neighbors need to be revived as the existing bilateral and multilateral framework at that time did not work effectively to maintain security in the Mediterranean and the Eastern neighborhood given the fact that "the EU got more closer to those regions with the latest round of enlargement". As a result of this foreign policy revision, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) project started to materialize in 2003 as a way to overcome the shortfalls of the previous EU's policies towards its neighbors.
The ENP official document which appeared in 2003 stressed that the closer geographical proximity between the enlarged EU and its new neighbors "will have an equal stake in furthering efforts to promote trans-national flows of trade and investment as well as more important shared interests in working together to tackle Tran-boundary threats from terrorism to air-borne pollution." The strategic objective of ENP is to "avoid drawing new diving lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union . . . and to have a ring of friends with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations."
ENP has targeted the neighbors who don't have currently the perspective of being members in the EU, namely the Southern Mediterranean states and the countries of the Western new independent states (NIS). According to the formal documents, the operation of ENP is supposed to be based on three principles differentiation, progressivity and benchmarking. According to these principles, the EU and the concerned partners work together to develop regional and bilateral action plans identifying priorities and policy targets that can be used as an assessment tool to measure the progress achieved. The policy targets are different from country to another according to their political, social and economic peculiarities. Consequently, new benefits are offered to EU's neighbors who are only committed to undertake progress in political and economic reform. Actions plan have been adopted by all neighboring states except Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria. The negotiations with the four states have taken different tracks. In September 2008, the EU and Algeria approved a roadmap for the implementation of the association agreement while the European Syrian association agreement was initialed in December 2008. Concerning Libya, the EU started negotiations on a framework agreement with Libya in November 2008 and due to the internal backlash on political opposition in Belarus the negotiation with the EU was suspended.
The action plans are adopted for 3 to 5 years. They usually contain key policies in the following fields: enhancement of political dialogue, economic and social development and reform, human rights and fundamental freedoms, combating terrorism, immigration, social integration, justice and security, Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, economic development and reform, cooperation in security and foreign policy, social development, issues relating to trade, market reform and legislations, science and technology, research, information society and audio-visual cooperation, communications and peoples dialogue and cultural dialogue. The evaluation of the implementation of action plans is conducted through regular dialogue within the existing bilateral institutions invented by the association and cooperation agreements these institutions include the associational councils, association committees, sub committees and the working groups. The European Commission also publishes regional and national annual reports assessing the progress of ENP.
To support partners in implementing their action plans, the EU has established a financial instrument called the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) to fund the local and regional projects of ENP. The ENPI allocation for the period 2007-2013 amounted 12 billion Euros. According to the ENPI regulation, the disbursement of ENPI is conditioned on the recipient readiness to fulfill meaning progress. It is also noted that the ENPI doesn't contain an essential element clause similar to the previous MEDA program. To illustrate on that, article 1(3) of the ENPI stipulates that "the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights and seeks to promote commitment to these values in partner countries through dialogue and cooperation". Contrary to that, the conditionality in the MEDA regulation was more legally strict as "Article 3 of This Regulation was based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and also for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which constitute an essential element thereof, the violation of which element would justify the adoption of appropriate measures. However, the EU can still suspend the financial assistance if partner states fail in meeting their commitments. In this direction, Article 28 of the ENPI says that "where a partner country fails to observe the principles referred to in Article1, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may take appropriate steps in respect of any Community assistance."
As an example for the ENPI application on national level, Egypt has received 558 million Euros within the ENPI to support a set of projects in the period of 2007 to 2010. the amount distributed in the following sectors: democracy, human rights and justice 40 million Euros 7%, developing the competitiveness and productivity of the Egyptian economy 220 million Euros 40%, ensuring the sustainability of the development process with better, and management of human and natural resources 298 million Euros 53%. This funding is entirely controlled by the government which can select NGOs to implement some projects.
Additionally, the Neighborhood Investment Facility was established at the end of 2007 and will start to support lending to ENP partners in 2008. The Commission allocated to the Facility an amount of 700 million Euros from 2007 to 2013. The governance facility is another financial instrument to reward reforms related to democracy, human rights, rule of law, governance of human security and immigration and economic regulatory and social governance. The EU allocated 50 million Euros from 2007 to 2010, and until now only Ukraine and Morocco have benefited from this instrument. The assistance priorities are illustrated in Country Strategy Papers covering seven years, National Indicative Programs covering three years and detailed annual programs. National action plans are also guiding the assistance programs.
The Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) is a very recent structure initiated by France as multi-lateral framework involving EU member states, the European Commission, the members and observers of Barcelona process including Mauritania and the other Mediterranean coastal states (Croatia- Bosnia and Herzegovina-Montenegro and Monaco). The formal launch of the UFM occurred in France on 13 July 2008. The Union is governed through a joint European and Mediterranean presidency. The first joint presidency is handled by Egypt and France. The Union has a full time secretary which is located in Barcelona. The UFM focuses on the regional and trans-national projects. It aims at increasing the regional integration and cohesion. According to the European Commission's paper, the UFM complements the other existing instruments such as the ENP. The project attempts to revive the Barcelona process through upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners, providing more co-ownership and proposing concrete projects which "have strong potential to promote the regional cohesion and economic integration, and to develop infrastructure interconnection." The Paris summit adopted projects in the following areas: de-pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highway, civil protection, alternative energy, higher education and research and business development.
4- The EU cooperation with its Neighboring States: Opportunities and Challenges.
The EU instruments with neighboring states have institutionalized bilateral dialogue on democracy and human rights issues. Financial assistance was received by governments and NGOs to enhance the protection of human rights. However, a lot should have be done to achieve genuine changes particularly in the South of Mediterranean where human rights at constant risk. The declared grand objective of these instruments is to have a region of prosperity, development, human rights and democracy. However, this objective seems to be far from being achieved. The EU policies in the Mediterranean have failed in addressing the root causes of insecurity such as poverty, social exclusion, regional and internal conflicts, despotism and mass human rights violations. There has been a wide gap between the objectives of EU policies in the region as illustrated in the different strategic official documents since Barcelona declaration in1995 on the one hand and the very modest results achieved on the ground in the areas of democracy, human rights, sustainable security and human development on the other hand.
A common observation can be reached after reading the European Commission progress reports on the implementation of the action plans so far which is that partners in the Mediterranean region especially countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan are not willing to take serious steps to transform the authoritarian political nature of their political regimes. They are only motivated to gain financial assistance to support their economies and trade but without having structure institutional and economic reforms that are conducive to satisfactory standards on economic development, transparency and fair distribution of wealth and resources.
In fact, the ENP project was perceived as a way to overcome the shortcomings of the previous EU policies towards the Mediterranean region. However, it has not represented a breakthrough from the old EU polices in the region. It has reflected continuity rather than novelty in terms of EU relations with its neighbors. It lacks the attractive incentives that are powerful enough to speed reforms and change in the targeted states such as access to EU's agricultural markets which would provide many partners with a great economic opportunity. The EU is also not clear on what so called "stake in the internal market" that will be enjoyed by partners. We can also add that the ENP was built on the assumption that partner states would be willing to cooperate with the EU to structurally improve the economic and political conditions of their countries. However, experience has demonstrated so far that most of the Mediterranean partners lack the political will to seriously respect their commitments. In the meantime, the EU has not developed policy choices to deal with those regimes which resist structural reform and development. It is also obvious that the Union for the Mediterranean has emphasized a very pragmatic and realistic approach towards the Mediterranean states which entirely ignore human rights and democracy deficit in the south.
The EU is reluctant to use strong political and economic leverages with the Mediterranean states to stimulate them to undertake effective reforms compared to the EU performance with the other European states which are recognized as member candidates. Conditionality is usually avoided by the EU as policy choice in relation to the Mediterranean and neighboring partners. The European officials failed to respond to the backlash on human rights defenders and civil society in Egypt or Tunisia while both countries have been considered appealing partners for the EU. The only exception on using more harsh policies to protest against human rights violations was in Belarus where the EU imposed targeted sanctions.
Finally, the policy framework with the Mediterranean lacks concrete benchmarking and timetable to address priorities in short, mid and long runs in a transparent and accountable way. Partners have gained financial advantages from the EU whether they fulfilled their reform commitments or not. For instance, although Egypt and Tunisia have not respected their commitments in human rights and good governance, the EU has engaged in discussion with both partners on the enhancement of bilateral relations.
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