By Moataz El Fegiery
This paper discusses the horizon of democracy and human rights in Egypt in light of the coming parliamentary and presidential elections. It starts by analyzing the current political landscape. It then highlights the main limitations before political and civil activism in Egypt and finally, presents a short analysis for the European Union’s engagement in domestic politics in Egypt. The paper argues that although Egypt has experienced a vibrant political and civil activism over the last two years around the demand of political and constitutional reform, the ruling political elite has not yet become under significant internal or external pressure that can lead to a paradigm shift from the Egyptian traditional authoritarian politics to a more open and democratic political system.
The political landscape in Egypt
It is commonly accepted among commentators that between 2003 and 2005, domestic politics in Egypt experienced a new kind of dynamism which was unprecedented since the military coup of 1952. Private satellite and printed media appeared with a critical discourse towards the governmental policies. Human rights organizations have become more influenced in providing its legal and advocacy services. Popular and political coalitions were at the front line of civic and political activism. Internet activism represented a new space for political and social debate. International pressure whether from the US or EU stimulated domestic actors to raise the ceiling of their demands.
The Egyptian ruling elite responded to this internal and external pressure by introducing a constitutional amendment whereby the first ever presidential mutli-candidate’s elections was held. Of course, the competition was limited due to constitutional limitations which complicated the opportunity of having independent candidates from outside the formal political parties. In addition to that, the electoral process itself was full of manipulation. However, some partisan candidates such as Ayman Nour ran the race and took use of this competition to build a popular constituency particularly among youth towards political change in Egypt. During the parliamentary elections and after Muslim brotherhood gained victory in many districts in the first electoral phase, the government flagrantly intervened in the other three electoral phases to control the results of the election.
The end of the parliamentary elections represented the beginning of the counter-attack campaign against political and civil activists including independent judges who bravely disclosed the irregularities which shaped the electoral process. Ayman Nour, the opposition leader who challenged Mubarak during the first presidential elections was sentenced for five years in prison in a politically motivated case. The government applied tough measures against political activists through the wide use of state of emergency and exceptional courts. An increasing number of journalists faced criminal prosecution on the background of their critical writings. NGOs have faced more legal and security restrictions. As a result of the rise of Islamists influence and the regional conflicts, the international actors have become less interested in promoting democratic change in Egypt.
However, the dynamism of 2003-2005 had its impact on the Egyptian domestic politics. Firstly, a new wave of social protesting movements has emerged across Egypt using strikes, informal trade or professional unions and demonstrations as means to change the governmental social and economic policies. Secondly, private media and internet activism integrated more social actors into the debate on political and social reform in Egypt. We can accordingly say that between 2006 until 2008 the political protesting has declined and the social-economic protesting become on the front line.
The political activism was revisited again in the beginning of 2009. The intensive debate on political succession in Egypt and the scheduled parliamentary and presidential elections in 2010-2011 have motivated the political opposition to renew their demand on democracy, electoral reform and power circulation. This actually has been coincided with the appearance of Mohamed El Baradei, the former general director of the International Atomic Agency in the Egyptian political sphere. He expressed his readiness to run the presidential elections under certain safeguards including the international observation on elections and the modification of the constitution to lift the existing arbitrary restrictions before presidential candidates. Then, the National Association for Change was established as a broad umbrella gathering the main political and social movements in Egypt. The Association has started a large campaign to pressure the government to political reforms and safeguard public liberties. Recently, a wide range of informal political groups decided to boycott the parliamentary elections as long as the government has not introduced any serious guarantees to ensure the fairness of the electoral process. Muslims brotherhood and other formal parties such as Al Wafd party decided to run the elections. However, it is not clear yet if this boycott would coincide with other political initiatives. Some commentators believe that although the boycott is understandable on the basis of the opposition previous negative experiences of elections, this boycott should be accompanied by a wide social and political activism to affect the popular constituencies in Egypt. It is also not clear what are the strategies of the National Coalition for Change over the coming decisive year of presidential elections a part from the initiative to collect one million signatures from Egyptian citizens.
There is always a lack of confidence among political groups in Egypt which in fact undermines the establishment of a wide political platform for the purpose of political reform in Egypt. This particularly found between the traditional formal political parties and the other informal political groups or social movements. The formal political parties believe that political activism should be expressed through political parties and within the legitimate channels of the political regime. Whereas, the informal political groups work outside the formal political institutions and consider the formal political parties as non-independent entities and tamed by the government. Moreover, the divide also exists between secular and Islamist opposition. Although the new National Coalition of Change attempted to avoid any discussion on the future relationship between state and religion to keep unity among its members, this issue has ever been a source of disunity in the Egyptian politics.
Despite the legal and political restrictions, the human rights movement has acquired more legitimacy in their region. Its social and political alliances have become more diverse. In Egypt, human rights defenders have maintained a dynamic relationship with the political reform movement and provided political activists with protection and solidarity. Human rights groups have recently started to work much more together. A coalition of Egyptian NGOs formed in 2008 to oppose the government’s plans to make the association law more restrictive. The same coalition developed a strategy to engage with the UN’s Universal Periodic Review on Egypt this year. Political and civil actors have improved their capacity to interact with the international community for the cause of human rights and democracy. Political actors themselves are now more eager than before to expose the poor human rights records of the government in international and regional forums. For the first time, the political opposition and civil society agree on the demand of having international observation on elections.
Political and civil activism under siege
Egyptian authorities have become less tolerant with political and civil activism, freedom of association and freedom of expression. The government attempts to control any potential challenges over the coming parliamentary and presidential elections. Recent local and international reports illustrate the increasing human rights violations against political and civil actors in Egypt. The existing legal, constitutional and political restrictive political environment in Egypt cannot be conducive to fair and competitive elections. It also obstructs the development of a vibrant political society.
The state of emergency has been applied in Egypt continuously since 1981 until it has become a permanent situation in which there are many fundamental rights are suspended particularly the right of fair trail and the right of personal freedom and safety. The State Security Courts and Military Courts which lack the basic guarantees of fair trial have been used in Egypt against suspected terrorist and other political groups. Prolonged detention has been used systematically in an arbitrary way. The government has failed to introduce a reasonable ground for the application of state of emergency over such a long time. The continuous application of the state of emergency in Egypt can not merely be seen in the context of the state struggle against terrorists. Conversely, it has become a systematic technique to suppress political competitors and ensure the stability of the ruling elite. In 2007, the government amended the constitution to pave the way for a new anti-terrorism law without being restricted by the constitutional human rights guarantees. The state of emergency is likely to be normalized under the planned anti-terrorism law which is expected to be adopted soon. The coming anti-terrorism law will be the second one since the government passed an anti terrorism law in 1992 which adopted a very vague and broad definition for the crime of terrorism and prescribed severe punishment for terrorist related acts which most of them amount to the death penalty.
The space of freedom of expression and freedom of association has been narrowed. Over the last few months private media and independent journalists have become under serious attack. Journalists are surrounded by certain limitations which threaten their independence. The referral of journalists to criminal courts on defamation cases continue. Recent reports speak about repeated governmental pressures over media owners to change the editorial policies of their outlets or to exclude some writers or refrain from publishing some critical articles. This is in fact a serious setback as private media was the most significant result of the political opening of 2003. State Security and ministry of social solidarity routinely intervene on the work of NGOs and rights groups. New modifications of the association law are expected to be released soon with the objective of hardening the reception of funding, registration and management. As for political parties, it is not possible to establish a political party within the current legal framework in Egypt. Moreover, this framework has enabled the government in many occasions to create internal divisions in these parties such as the recent case of Al Ghad party which was headed by Ayman Nour. Generally speaking, the legal framework of NGOs and political parties indulge the members of these associations into internal disputes and divisions.
Political exclusion is the right word that can clearly describe the state of political participation in Egypt. The ruling elite have monopolized the political power over decades without any real form of accountability. Egyptians face severe violations of their right to participate in public life through elections and those who seek to exercise this right must contend with a broad array of restrictions and abuses by both the executive and security. Moreover, the constitutional provision on presidential elections denies the possibility of having serious candidates in the presidential elections. In reality, this provision will only allow candidates who have been approved by the ruling party. The government has applied several policies and tactics to exclude and suppress any potential political competitors. The government tries to market the idea that political opposition is hijacked by Mulsim-brothrhood which is not true. There are other liberal political alternatives in Egypt which are being excluded or suppressed. Following the first multi-candidates presidential elections, Ayman Nour, the ex- rival of President Mubarak in the elections have been trialed and convicted in a politically motivated case. Although Nour has been released in 2009 on the ground of his health conditions, he is still deprived of his right of political participation and even his right to work as a lawyer. He and his supporters have been systematically pressured by the government and security. In the beginning of 2010, Mohamed El Baradei, the ex-director of the International Agency for Atomic Energy, has declared his readiness to run the coming presidential elections but the existing constitutional restrictions exclude him form any future presidential competition. El Baredi and his supporters have established a national coalition which struggles for political reform and fair and competitive election. Many cases have been documented by right groups which indicate the pressure practiced over El Baradei supporters. Moreover, the continuous repression of Muslim brotherhood has declined any opportunities to engage in dialogue with the group to ensure its adherence to democratic principles and fundamental human rights principles. Unfortunately, this repression is likely to strengthen the hardliners inside the group at the expense of the reformers.
International Engagement with Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt: Reflections on the Role of the European Union
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements continue to function as the principal institutional framework through which Europe addresses issues of human rights and democracy in many Arab countries and Israel. European states and institutions employ the instruments available within this framework, primarily periodic bilateral talks between the EU and each partner state conducted in meetings of the partner councils, which include high-level political representation, and the special subsidiary committees focused on diverse topics such as human rights, which include experts from both the European and Mediterranean partner states. The EU also urges the implementation of ENP action plans, seeing these as a political declaration reached voluntarily with partner countries to guide the process of political, economic, and social reform and human development. Indeed, the level of relations between the EU and partner states is determined based on these plans. Despite the ambitious objectives pursued by the ENP since 2003—the achievement of development and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region within a framework governed by human rights values, democracy, and civil society—the results thus far have been very modest relative to the total financial and human resources invested by the EU with its Mediterranean partners. This is not solely due to the lack of political will on the part of most Arab partner states to implement the promised reforms. The tools available in the ENP framework are too weak to effectively pressure or encourage Arab partner states, and politically influential European states within the EU have often disregarded issues of human rights and democracy in the southern rim of the Mediterranean. This has allowed many authoritarian Arab partner states to successfully reconstitute their relations with Europe on foundations diametrically opposed to their peoples’ aspirations for democracy, human rights, and human development.
The revival of the ENP requires a combination of attractive incentives and conditionality based on a time bound system of benchmarking and accountability. Attractive incentives are needed to change the political calculations of the ruling elites in the Mediterranean region. In this direction, the EU should draw on its long experience in pushing reforms in other states which have had the horizon of being members in the EU. The current negotiations between the EU and its partners notably Egypt concerning the enhancement of the bilateral relations should be clearly conditioned on certain human rights and good governance priorities that are necessary to open up the political space in both countries. The first priority that should be given a considerable interest is freedom of association for political parties, NGOs and professional and trade unions. The current political circumstances in both countries indicate that human rights defenders bloggers and political activists face increasing threats and intimidation by the authorities. An effective system of international protection and moral support is direly needed for those persons. Freedom of association is a strategic entry to develop a vibrant political society and electoral competition. Secondly, securities and anti-terrorism measures should not be used by both political regimes to justify the severe violations of political and civil rights. The state of emergency in Egypt has become a systematic technique to suppress political competitors and ensure the stability of the ruling elite. In 2007, the Egyptian government amended the constitution to pave the way for a new anti-terrorism law without being restricted by the constitutional human rights guarantees. The state of emergency is likely to be normalized under the planned anti-terrorism law which is expected to be adopted soon. Thirdly, media independence and pluralism should also be a priority to ensure free public debate and the fair representation of all political currents. The new media and internet freedoms provide activists and human rights defenders with a viable space for discussion and recruitment. However, authorities have transformed internet into a space for suppression. As for traditional media, although authorities in Egypt has shown a remarkable tolerance with the critical tone of private media outlets over the last 5 years, this tolerance is not legally protected. A lot of journalists still face serious criminal accusations and lawsuits because of their critical views. The media landscape in Tunisia is gloomy. The state shows strict control over all channels of expression. Fourthly, the legal prerequisites for judiciary independence should be promoted in accordance with the international standards. Most of the financial support for this sector has been allocated to promote the judicial body by physical and technical equipment and training. These programs will bring about nothing if the constitutional and legal framework subordinate the judiciary to the executive. As for elections in Egypt the politics of political exclusion should be resisted by the EU. In both countries political opposition is not able to compete on a level playing field with the ruling elites. Parliamentary elections are marred by forgery and manipulation which have been documented by credible local and international monitoring groups. The presidential election is cosmetic in both countries. Serious political opposition and candidates face serious constitutional and legal restrictions to run the elections. The political competition in a country like Egypt or Tunisia should not be simplified to a dispute between ruling elites and Islamic opposition. There are other emerging liberal and leftist alternatives who are constantly suppressed and excluded from the political sphere. We should not underestimate Europe’s fear from the power of political Islam in the South but this fear should not be transformed into unlimited support for corrupted regimes. The European officials and civil society should engage in an open dialogue with moderate Islamists to integrate them in the democratic process. At the same time, the moral and political support of other growing liberal voices can counter-balance the influence of Islamists.
The current policies of the EU towards Egypt are not likely to foster democratic change or a significant progress in human rights. This is due not only to the unwillingness of most southern Mediterranean states to make tangible reforms in these areas, but also to the fact that influential European states with political weight inside the EU have not made human rights a priority. In addition, the tools at the disposal of the ENP are insufficiently strong to change the political calculations of the ruling elite in the southern Mediterranean. Moreover, there are fears that deepening ties between the EU and partner states will not be effectively used to achieve real reforms in the areas of democracy and human rights in southern Mediterranean states. To breakthrough this uncertain path, the EU should revisit its approach in the region to combine both attractive incentives and conditionality. Finally, A joint vision among European states towards the priority of democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean region is crucial to develop an efficient and consistent policies in the region.
Conclusion
The existing political scene in Egypt is gloomy. The state of public freedoms and political participation has deteriorated. The political regime has shown readiness to stick to the traditional authoritarian politics to ensure smooth and stable political succession after Mubarak. Constitutional and legal environment in Egypt is not conducive to a fair and competitive parliamentary and presidential election. Internal political and civil actors hardly endeavor to find spaces for their movement. They count on having a bottom up change. However, the strategies to realize this objective are not clear. The internal cohesion of political opposition is also questioned. The movement of political reform and human rights in Egypt should be backed by genuine international political and diplomatic pressure on the Egyptian political ruling elite especially over the coming year which will experience a decisive presidential election in Egypt which will likely form the pa
No comments:
Post a Comment